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More Money: Understanding Recent Changes 
in the Monetary Base
William T. Gavin
The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 took a turn for the worse in September 2008.
Until then, Federal Reserve actions taken to improve the functioning financial markets did not
affect the monetary base. The unusual lending and purchase of private debt was offset by the
sale of Treasury securities so that the total size of the balance sheet of the Fed remained relatively
unchanged. In September, however, the Fed stopped selling securities as it made massive purchases
of private debt and issued hundreds of billions of dollars in short-term loans. The result was a
doubling of the size of the monetary base in the final four months of 2008. This article discusses
the details of the programs that the Fed has initiated since the crisis began, shows which programs
have grown as the monetary base grew, and discusses some factors that will determine whether
this rapid increase in the monetary base will lead to rapid inflation. (JEL E31, E42)
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we should expect to see high inflation following
such rapid monetary growth.
Figure 1 shows that this rapid surge in the
monetary base is concentrated entirely in the
accumulation of bank reserves. (Throughout this
article, the generic word “bank” is used instead
of the official term, “depository financial institu-
tion.”) Bank deposits at the Fed include three
components. Two are small and have changed
little since the economic crisis began in August
2007; they are deposits used to satisfy reserve
requirements and those used to satisfy required
clearing balances.2 The third component, “excess
reserves,” accounts for the doubling of the mone-
tary base. This rapid increase is directly related to
Federal Reserve programs initiated or expanded
T
he monetary base is the sum of cur-
rency in circulation and bank deposits
at Federal Reserve Banks. Between mid-
September and December 31, 2008,
the U.S. monetary base increased from approxi-
mately $890 billion to $1,740 billion, doubling
in a little more than 3 months.1 This is a concern
because, under normal circumstances, we would
associate such a rapid rise in the monetary base
with a sharp acceleration of inflation. But today,
more people seemed to be worried about deflation
than a sudden rebound of inflation. The purpose
of this article is to explore the sources of growth
in the monetary base and to ask whether or not
1 These data are derived from the Fed’s H4.1 release 
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/). This measure of the
monetary base is named as the series WSBASE on the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database. For technical reasons
(adjustments for seasonal factors, reserve requirements, carryover,
“as of,” and cash items in process of collection), the numbers here
do not correspond to either the Board of Governor’s measure of
the monetary base on the H3 release or the St. Louis adjusted
monetary base.
2 See Stevens (1993) for a description of required clearing balances.
See Anderson and Rasche (2001) for a description of the sweep
programs that reduced the amount of required reserves essentially
to that which would normally be held as a buffer for clearing checks
and meeting uncertain cash withdrawals.
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ing of financial markets under stress. 
Since lowering its federal funds rate target to
the range of 0 to 0.25 percent, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) has referred to its
latest policy actions as “credit policy.” These new
programs are distinguished from traditional mone-
tary policy by the type of assets purchased by the
Federal Reserve. Traditional programs involve the
purchase and sale of U.S. Treasury securities,
whereas the new credit-oriented policies involve
the purchase of non-Treasury securities, including
commercial paper and asset-backed securities. By
purchasing such assets, the Fed hopes to reduce
risk premiums and improve flows through the
specific private markets (Bernanke, 2009). Yet,
although the emphasis of these credit programs
is on the types of non-Treasury securities being
purchased (that is, the composition of the Fed’s
assets), nontraditional and traditional programs
share one common characteristic: The purchase
of any asset by the Fed, unless offset by some
other action, increases simultaneously both the
Fed’s balance sheet assets and its liabilities.
The next section of this article shows the
Fed’s balance sheet in January 2007 and again
in January 2009, highlighting the balance sheet
changes since the summer of 2007.3 It highlights
the new programs and shows which have con-
tributed most to the recent surge in the monetary
base. The following section then discusses eco-
nomic and institutional factors that will influence
the Fed’s ability to maintain price stability as the
economy recovers from the recession and the
financial crisis.
THE FED’S BALANCE SHEET—
BEFORE AND AFTER
It would be an error to believe that the Fed’s
new programs to improve the functioning of credit
markets began only in September 2008; they did
not. But a major change did occur in September:
The Fed stopped selling Treasury securities as it
increased lending to financial institutions and
purchased non-Treasury assets. As Figure 1 shows,
before mid-September 2008, the Fed’s practice of
selling Treasuries as it purchased other financial
instruments largely insulated the monetary base
from these new programs—bank deposits at the
Fed increased little.4
Table 1 presents a somewhat simplified view
of the Fed’s balance sheet to help illustrate the
sources and uses of the monetary base today.5 The
big changes in the traditional items on the asset
side of the balance sheet are in outright holdings
of Treasury securities, which fell from $778.9
billion in 2007 to $475.2 billion in 2009. This has
virtually wiped out the Fed’s holdings of Treasury
bills, which fell from $277 billion to $18.4 billion.
The Fed’s holding of notes and bonds was reduced
from $467.9 billion to $412.9 billion. But of those
the Fed still holds, $125.1 billion has been lent
through the Term Securities Lending Facility
(TSLF) to securities dealers. Note that changes
in the TSLF do not affect the size of the balance
sheet, but they do reduce the liquidity of the Fed’s
security portfolio.
Holdings of federal agency debt rose from 0
to $26.7 billion. Note that in December 2008, the
FOMC authorized the Trading Desk of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to purchase up to
$100 billion of agency debt in the first half of
2009. Repurchase agreements (repos) decreased
from $27.5 billion to $17.1 billion. Another big
change among the traditional assets was the big
increase in primary lending: from $0.3 billion in
the week ending January 17, 2007, to $65.0 billion
in the week ending January 28, 2009. A new part
of this lending program was the very public cam-
paign to eliminate the “stigma” associated with
borrowing at the discount window, an obstacle
to overcome if these lending facilities were to be
implemented as intended.
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3 See Balbach and Burger (1976) for an elementary introduction to
the derivation of the monetary base from the central bank’s balance
sheet. Their appendix includes an application of their method to
the Fed’s balance sheet in 1976. See Anderson and Rasche (1996)
for the technical details in the derivation of the St. Louis adjusted
monetary base.
4 See Thornton (2009).
5 This information can be found in the H4.1 release in the table show-
ing factors that supply and absorb reserves. These factors are found
primarily on the Fed’s balance sheet, but also include monetary
items from Treasury’s balance sheet.From January 17, 2007, to January 28, 2009, the
traditional items on the asset side of the balance
sheet decreased by $224.5 billion. The decline in
outright holdings of Treasury securities, repos,
and float was partially offset by increases in pri-
mary lending and federal agency debt. The other
longtime items on the balance sheet are either
unchanged or relatively small. These include the
gold stock, special drawing rights, other assets,
lending through the traditional channels, second-
ary and seasonal lending, and float.
Next, we turn to the new programs established
after the crisis began. The Trading Desk has just
begun to buy mortgage-backed securities (adding
$6.8 billion as of January 28, 2009) under instruc-
tions from the FOMC to purchase as much as
$500 billion in the first half of 2009. Also included
on the balance sheet is a total of $415.9 billion in
loans to banks through the Term Auction Facility
(TAF).6 Figure 2 shows the history of lending
under this program initiated in December 2007—
the same time that the Fed began lending securi-
ties to primary dealers through the TSLF.
On January 28, 2009, there were $32.1 billion
in loans outstanding in the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility (PDCF) and other broker-dealer loans,
$14.6 billion in loans through the Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility (AMLF), and $38.3 billion in
direct loans to the American Insurance Group
(AIG). Figure 3 shows the history of lending under
these three new programs, as well as the tradi-
tional discount window lending of primary credit.
Certain new programs operate as special-
purpose vehicles (SPVs) wholly owned by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The assets
and liabilities of these SPVs are included on the
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. The next item in
Table 1 (under “New program portfolio”) is the
sum of the private assets purchased under new
programs; the total was $389.9 billion the week
ending January 28, 2009. Among these SPVs is
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
Gavin



































Weekly Average, $ Billions




6 For information about the acronyms and new programs, go to
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/recentactions.htm.Gavin
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Table 1
Factors Affecting Reserve Balances ($ billions)
Week Ending
January 17, 2007 January 28, 2009
Assets supplying reserves
Gold stock  11.0 11.0
Special drawing rights  2.2 2.2
Treasury securities* 778.9 475.2
Bills 277 18.4
Notes and bonds (nominal) 467.9 412.9
Notes and bonds (inflation-indexed) 30.2 39.4
Inflation compensation 3.8 4.5
Federal agency debt 0 26.7
Mortgage-backed securities NA (01/05/09)† 6.8
Repurchase agreements  27.5 17.1
Term Auction Facility (TAF)‡ NA (12/17/07) 415.9





Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and other broker-dealer loans NA (03/17/08) 32.1
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)  NA (09/19/08) 14.6
Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) Liquidity Facility (AMLF)
Loans to American Insurance Group (AIG) NA (09/16/08) 38.3
New program portfolio — 389.9
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) NA (10/27/08) 316.2
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) NA (11/24/08) 0.0
Maiden Lane NA (06/26/08) 27.0
Maiden Lane II NA (11/10/08) 19.7
Maiden Lane III NA (11/25/08) 27.0
Central bank liquidity swaps NA (12/12/07) 465.9
Other assets  39.6 44.4
Memo item
Treasury coin outstanding (TCO) 38.3 38.8
Total factors supplying reserves = Total assets + TCO 897.5 2,041.9created to support activity in the market for the
highest-rated (A1/P1) commercial paper. This
program, created in the aftermath of the troubles
at AIG, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, has
grown rapidly to $316.2 billion, with the Fed pro-
viding most of the new lending in this market.
Also included are three new structured invest-
ment vehicles created to buy and hold certain
troubled assets of specific insolvent institutions.
Through Maiden Lane, the Fed owns $27.0 billion
of the poorer-quality assets from the troubles at
Bear Stearns. Through Maiden Lane II and Maiden
Lane III, it owns $19.7 billion and $27.0 billion,
respectively, of troubled assets purchased in sup-
port of the insurance firm AIG. Figure 4 shows
the history of assets purchased under these new
programs.
On December 12, 2007, the Federal Reserve
established temporary swap lines with foreign
central banks. Under these swap arrangements,
the Federal Reserve provides U.S. dollar deposits
at the Federal Reserve in exchange for an amount
of foreign currency deposits at the foreign central
bank. The amount is determined by the prevailing
exchange rate. The currency is swapped back at
a future date at the swap exchange rate used in
the original transaction. All exchange rate risk is
the burden of the borrowing central bank. Figure 5
Gavin
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Table 1, cont’d
Factors Affecting Reserve Balances ($ billions)
Week Ending
January 17, 2007 January 28, 2009
Liabilities absorbing reserves
Federal Reserve notes held by Treasury 0.2 0.3
Reverse repos, international accounts, and dealers (RRP) 30.5 73.1
Treasury deposits  4.7 230.4
General account  4.7 55.5
Supplemental financing account NA (09/17/08) 174.8
Foreign official  0.1 0.2
Service-related and other demand deposits  7.2 7.9
Other liabilities and capital  36.7 50.4
Total factors other than the monetary base absorbing reserves 79.4 362.3
Monetary base 818.1 1,679.6
Currency in the hands of the public (in circulation)  757.6 830.6
Vault cash in depository institutions  50.3 53.5
Counted as required reserves 32.3 41.2
Counted as surplus cash 18 12.3
Depository institution reserve balances  10.2 795.5
Held as required reserves 6.1 26.3
Held as excess reserves 4.1 769.2
Total liabilities plus Treasury coin outstanding 897.5 2,041.9
NOTE: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding. Data are from the H4.1 release (Federal Reserve Statistical Release:
Factors Affecting Reserve Balances); see www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/.
*Includes $125.1 billion lent to primary dealers through the Term Securities Lending Facility.
†NA refers to an item that was created after the financial crisis was under way. The date refers to the day that the Fed announced the
program or began to purchase this asset.
‡For information about the new programs created to solve the financial crisis, go to: www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/recentactions.htm.Gavin
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Reserve Bank Credit: Term Auction Credit (average) 
Figure 2






















Weekly Average, $ Billions
Credit Extended to AIG (average) 
Reserve Bank Credit: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
MM Fund Liquidity Facility (average) 
Reserve Bank Credit: Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(average) 
Reserve Bank Credit: Primary Credit to 
Depository Institutions (average) 
Figure 3
Total Loans and DiscountsGavin
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Net Portfolio Holdings of Commercial Paper Funding Facility LLC 
Net Portfolio Holdings of Maiden Lane II LLC (average) 
Net Portfolio Holdings of Maiden Lane III LLC (average) 




















Weekly Average, $ Billions
Currency Swaps
Figure 5
Foreign Exchange Swapsshows the dramatic rise in foreign exchange assets
from currency swap arrangements; these swaps
totaled $465.9 billion as of the week ending
January 28, 2009.
Overall, total assets added by the Federal
Reserve’s nontraditional credit programs were
$1,363.5 billion the week ending January 28, 2009.
Total factors supplying monetary base skyrocketed
that week to a little more than $2 trillion, with
almost all the increase coming after mid-September
2008.
Next, we turn to the liability side of the Fed’s
balance sheet. Not all liabilities of the Fed are
included in the monetary base. Most items on
the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet that
are not included in the monetary base are small
or relatively unchanged. There has been a rela-
tively large increase—from $30.5 billion to $73.1
billion—in reverse repos with dealers, foreign
official, and other international accounts. The
other—and the most important item absorbing
reserves—is the Treasury deposit account. The
Treasury general account rose from $4.7 billion
to $55.5 billion; for more than 20 years, the Fed
has maintained its general account (used for tax
collection and government disbursements) near
a $5 billion balance. In September 2008, the
Treasury created a new “supplemental financing
account,” which held $174.8 billion on January
28, 2009. At inception, this account held $500
billion obtained by the Treasury as proceeds from
selling a special issue of Treasury bills to the
public. The mechanism for this sale was quite
simple: Each purchaser of a Treasury bill paid
with a bank check or debit. When these transac-
tions cleared, the Federal Reserve transferred the
amounts from bank deposits (reserve accounts)
to the Treasury account (which absorbs reserves,
but is not part of the monetary base). In the second
half of January, the Treasury allowed the special
issue of Treasury bills to mature, to avoid hitting
statutory debt limits. As the Treasury repaid the
owners of these bills, deposits were transferred
from the Treasury’s deposits at the Fed to the
Gavin
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Factors Absorbing Reserve Funds: Treasury Supplemental 
Financing Account (average) 
Factors Absorbing Reserve Funds: 
Treasury Deposits with Federal Reserve Banks 
(average) 









Total Factors Other than Monetary Base Absorbing Reservesdeposits of the banks whose customers owned
the maturing bills. Doing so increases the mone-
tary base, dollar for dollar.
Overall, other factors absorbing reserves rose
from $79.4 billion in January 2007 to $362.3 bil-
lion in January 2009. Figure 6 shows the total
factors other than the monetary base that absorb
reserves, with detail shown for Treasury deposits
(both the general account and the supplemental
financing account).
The bottom section in Table 1 lists the com-
ponents of the monetary base. The “monetary
base” is defined as currency in circulation and
bank demand deposits at the Fed. Currency in
circulation includes vault cash (coin and Federal
Reserve notes held by the depository institutions)
and cash held by the general public. Bank reserve
deposits are sometimes referred to as federal funds.
Thus, the federal funds rate is the interest rate
that banks pay to borrow Federal Reserve deposits
from other banks. The monetary base includes
coin and Federal Reserve notes held overseas
because we have no measure of the amount held
overseas, only the total amount outstanding.7
And, regardless of where they are held, Federal
Reserve notes are a liability of the Fed.
Between January 17, 2007, and January 28,
2009, currency in the hands of the public grew
from $757.6 billion to $830.6 billion. Vault cash
grew from $50.3 billion to $53.5 billion. In January
2007, $32.3 billion of the vault cash was used to
meet reserve requirements; in January 2009, $41.2
billion of vault cash was used. In the early period,
$18.0 billion of vault cash was counted as surplus
vault cash; in January 2009, $12.3 billion was
counted as surplus vault cash.
The interesting change in the monetary base
was in reserve balances held in demand deposits
at the Federal Reserve. These deposits grew from
$10.2 billion the week ending January 17, 2007,
to $795.5 billion the week ending January 28,
2009. Of this large amount, $769.2 billion was
held as excess reserves at the Fed.
WILL RAPID GROWTH IN THE
MONETARY BASE CAUSE RAPID
INFLATION?
The enormous accumulation of excess reserves
began at the time of the Lehman bankruptcy and
rescue of AIG in mid-September. Whether this
large increase in the monetary base is a harbinger
of rapid inflation in the future depends on how
the Federal Reserve and the U.S. government act
when financial markets return to more-normal
behavior and the recession ends.
The difficulty of maintaining price stability
will depend on the size the balance sheet reaches
before the crisis ends, the quality of the assets in
the portfolio, and the policy followed to manage
the interest rate paid on reserves. Any attempt to
predict whether inflation will occur must rely on
predictions about the Fed’s response to events and
its exit from these new programs (that is, reduc-
ing the size of the balance sheet) as the economy
recovers from recession and financial crisis.
Analysis of future monetary policy must
consider the October 1, 2008, Congressional
authorization for the Fed to pay interest to banks
on both required reserve and excess reserve bal-
ances. By increasing this rate relative to the federal
funds rate target, the Fed provides an incentive
for banks to hold more deposits at the Fed. By
reducing this rate the Fed encourages banks to
expand their lending—and the money supply.
When the FOMC set the federal funds rate target
to the range 0 to ¼ percent on December 16, 2008,
it also set the interest paid on both required and
excess reserves equal to ¼ percent.
A logical question might be why depository
institutions would choose to hold $800 billion
in excess reserves that are earning so little. Two
answers are important, one at the level of the
individual bank and one at an aggregate level.
First, for the individual bank, the risk-free rate of
¼ percent must be the bank’s perception of its best
investment opportunity. Note that on January 28,
2009, the interest rate on the 3-month Treasury
bill was less than ¼ percent. The other is that,
perhaps because of market conditions—the dra-
matic decline in the price of bank stocks and the
fall in the market value of assets—the bank finds
Gavin
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7 See Porter and Judson (1996) for estimates of the amount of cur-
rency held abroad.itself undercapitalized. In such conditions, the
bank is likely to hold relatively more safe assets
while it builds capital by cutting costs, raising fee
income, and hoping for a recovery in both the
economy and its stock price.
Second, the banking system as a whole cannot
create or destroy bank deposits at the Fed. Only
the Fed (and technically, the Treasury) can create
or destroy bank reserves. If one bank makes a loan
and the funds are deposited in another bank, then
the ownership of the deposits at the Fed would
change, but the total bank deposits at the Fed
would remain the same. In theory, the banking
system reduces excess reserves—but only by
expanding loans and the money supply in a way
that increases required reserves by an equivalent
amount. The key is that the Fed will have to drain
reserves when the economy begins to recover if
it is to prevent a rapid acceleration of inflation.
That necessity drives the current discussion of
exit strategies.8
The ease with which the Fed can reduce the
size of its balance sheet in the future depends on
many factors, including the term of its loan port-
folio, the quality of assets that it holds outright,
and the market’s appetite for repurchasing these
financial instruments. The authorization for the
ultimate size of new programs varies and has
grown since the beginning of the crisis. Table 2
lists each new program and the upper limit author-
ized as of January 28, 2009. Of course, in some
cases the limits will be determined by the avail-
able assets and/or by the demand for the program.
(Note that there are zero assets in the MMIFF,
which has an authorization of $540 billion.)
When the time comes to shrink the monetary
base, the Fed could allow the lending programs
to expire as loans mature and sell the assets that
it holds outright. If the crisis is over, the assets
should be priced in the market and the Fed should
expect to recover most of its investment in such
assets.
Inflation does not appear to be a risk in the
current environment: The economy is in reces-
sion. Inflation is falling and is not expected to
return before the recession ends. If inflation
resumes but the economy does not recover, policy-
makers will face a difficult choice. Monitoring
the size and composition of the monetary base as
the economy recovers will help us understand
what actions are needed (and should be taken)
by the Fed and the Congress to prevent a return
to a high-inflation economy.
8 See Bernanke (2009).
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Table 2
New Program Use and Authorization ($ billions)
Week ending 
Assets supplying reserves Announced authorization January 28, 2009
Mortgage-backed securities 500 6.8
Term Auction Facility (TAF) 600 415.8
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) No announced limit 32.1
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Money Market  No announced limit 14.6
Mutual Fund (MMMF) Liquidity Facility (AMLF)
Loans to American Insurance Group (AIG) 60 38.3
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) No announced limit 316.2
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) 540 0
Maiden Lane 29 27.0
Maiden Lane II 22.5 19.7
Maiden Lane III 30 27.0
Swaps No announced limit 465.9REFERENCES
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